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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
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CONTRIBUTION TO NIE 11-14-69:

SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

SUPPLEMENT

ESTIMATED SOVIET EXPENDITURES FOR

THE GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

1964-73

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Estimated Soviet Expenditures for
the General Purpose Forces
1964-73

Summary

Activities and force levels estimated for Soviet general purpose forces in 1969 imply expenditures of about 6.0 billion rubles (equivalent to about 19.4 billion dollars in US cost terms), just under 30 percent of total Soviet defense and space spending. This represents an increase of nearly 10 percent in spending for general purpose forces since 1964, primarily the result of increases in the ground forces. Projections of general purpose forces to 1973 indicate

Note: This supplement presents the expenditure implications of the estimates and projections of Soviet general purpose forces contained in the OSR contributions to NTE 11-14-69 (SR, August 1969, and SR, September 1969).

With the exception of expenditures for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E), all identifiable costs related to the general purpose mission are reflected in these expenditure implications.

These expenditures do not include those incurred by ballistic missile submarine forces, which are included in expenditures for strategic attack forces (see SR, July 1969).

Ruble values are given in new rubles established by the Soviet currency reform of 1 January 1961 and are in constant 1955 prices. Dollar values are given in constant 1968 prices. Detailed statistics and a discussion of the measurement of the estimates are presented at Annex.

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that this level of expenditures will be maintained or slightly increased.

Although expenditures for general purpose forces are estimated to increase throughout the period 1964-73, they decline as a share of total defense and space spending and in 1973 are expected to account for only 25 percent of the total. During the same period estimated spending for space and military research, development, test, and evaluation increases sizably as a share of the total while the strategic forces' share remains fairly constant.

In the period 1964-73 ground forces are expected to account for about 50 percent of total general purpose forces expenditures and naval forces for about 30 percent. Tactical aviation and military transport aviation each are estimated to account for 10 percent.

In 1969 ground forces expenditures are estimated to be 3.0 billion rubles (10.2 billion dollars). The troop callup at the time of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 resulted in a slight increase in outlays. The buildup along the Sino-Soviet border, which began in 1965, has had a greater effect over time. The rise in expenditures during the Sixties is expected to continue through 1970, when it is currently anticipated that the border buildup will be leveling off.

Tactical air force expenditures in 1969 are expected to be 0.5 billion rubles (1.5 billion dollars). Expenditures have declined since 1964 and are expected to continue to do so through 1970. During 1971-73, the projected introduction into the force of two new tactical fighter aircraft will raise outlays again.

Extensive construction and conversion programs estimated to be under way for the Soviet general purpose naval forces imply an outlay of about 1.9 billion rubles (6.0 billion dollars) in 1969, continuing a steady rise which began in 1964. These programs are mostly directed toward the highest priority task of

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the Soviet Navy--countering the US ballistic missile submarine force. Although these programs are expected to continue at least through 1973, a slight decline in naval expenditures is anticipated due to the projected decline in spending for naval aviation.


Spending for military transport aviation during 1969 is estimated to be 0.6 billion rubles (1.7 billion dollars). Investment expenditures have declined slightly since 1964 as the Soviets have continued a relatively low level of procurement spending for medium transports and for helicopters. A simultaneous decline in the number of light transport aircraft has enabled the Soviets to keep operating costs generally stable for military transport aviation as a whole. In the Seventies it is expected that the Soviets will be spending more for the procurement of larger aircraft such as the AN-22. The total Soviet airlift capacity is projected to be continually improving from 1964 through 1973.

Soviet military manpower in the general purpose forces will probably reach 2.0 million in 1969 and may stabilize at about this level through 1973. This is an increase of some 240,000 men since 1964. Most of the increase has been caused by developments in the ground forces--the Sino-Soviet border buildup and the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

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I. Total Expenditures for General Purpose Forces

Activities and force levels estimated for Soviet general purpose forces in 1969 imply expenditures of about 6.0 billion rubles (19.4 billion dollars), just under 30 percent of total defense and space expenditures. Expenditures have increased nearly 10 percent from the 1964 level of 5.5 billion rubles (17.3 billion dollars).

During the years 1970-73, expenditures are expected to remain relatively stable with only a slight increase forecast--from 6.0 billion rubles (19.3 billion dollars) in 1970 to 6.1 billion rubles (19.6 billion dollars) in 1973. Expenditures for ground forces are estimated to account for almost two-thirds of the increase in total general purpose forces spending during the period 1964-73. Figure 1 (opposite page) shows estimated expenditures by element for the years 1964, 1969, and 1973.

The rate of growth in estimated expenditures for general purpose forces for the period 1964-69 was less than that for total Soviet defense and space expenditures, and the general purpose forces' share of the total has declined slightly. It is expected that this trend will continue, and in 1973 the share will amount to about 25 percent.

The ground forces are estimated to account for about half of general purpose forces expenditures during the period 1964-73. The naval forces are expected to account for about 30 percent and tactical air forces and transport aviation each are expected to receive about 10 percent.

On a resource category basis, operating expenditures (such as outlays for pay and allowances, spare parts, and expendables like food and POL) accounted for slightly more than half the total expen-

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
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Figure 2

Estimated Soviet Expenditures for Elements of the General Purpose Forces, 1964-73

BILLION NEW RUBLES
(1955 PRICES)

INVESTMENT EXPENDITURES
OPERATING EXPENDITURES



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ditures for 1964. By 1973, this figure is expected to have increased to nearly 60 percent. Figure 2, on page 6, presents the resource category breakdown for the four elements of the general purpose forces.

The rise in the share of the total devoted to operating costs results both from increases in the cost of operating increasingly sophisticated equipment and from increased personnel expenditures, which are expected to rise nearly 15 percent during the period as the estimated manpower required by the postulated forces increases by nearly 300,000 men.

II. Mission Elements

A. Ground Forces

Expenditures for the ground forces in 1969 are estimated to be 3.0 billion rubles (10.2 billion dollars). This represents a 20 percent increase over expenditures in 1964. During the period 1964-69, spending for the ground forces grew steadily, and the ground forces' share of rising total military and space spending remained a fairly constant 15 percent. Ground force expenditures as a share of general purpose forces expenditures were on the increase--from 45 percent in 1964 to 50 percent in 1969.

The troop callup at the time of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 has resulted in a slight increase in outlays, but the buildup on the Sino-Soviet border, which has been going on since 1965, has had a greater effect over time. There are more than 30 divisions, most of which were formerly at low strength or in cadre status, now being maintained at or developed toward combat strength along the Sino-Soviet border and in Czechoslovakia. Further, 19 more divisions are estimated to be in the current Soviet order of battle this year than in 1964 as a result both of the buildup and of a recent reassessment of the evidence on the size of the ground forces.

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This increase in the number and combat availability of divisions has contributed substantially to the increase in spending for the ground forces, which has grown some 0.5 billion rubles (1.6 billion dollars) since 1964. A large part of this increase resulted from additional expenditures for procurement of tanks (up nearly 25 percent), ammunition (up 15 percent), and tactical missiles and rockets (up 100 percent).

Estimated expenditures for procurement of tactical nuclear weapons during this period have been fairly constant but at a significant annual level--0.2 to 0.3 billion rubles (0.2 to 0.3 billion dollars).

Expenditures for the ground forces are expected to reach a peak of 3.1 billion rubles (10.2 billion dollars) in 1970, at which time it is anticipated that the border buildup will be leveling off. Expenditures are estimated to decline slightly from that point to 2.9 billion rubles (9.9 billion dollars) in 1973. This will result from an expected decline in investment primarily due to reduced spending for procurement of ground force weapons. Operating expenditures, which have increased about 20 percent since 1964, are expected to continue to rise and to partially offset the decline in investment spending.

B. Tactical Air Forces

Expenditures in 1969 for the Tactical Air Forces (TAF) are estimated to be 0.5 billion rubles (1.5 billion dollars), almost 10 percent of the total for general purpose forces. This is a decline of nearly 30 percent in spending since 1964, when TAF expenditures were 0.7 billion rubles (1.8 billion dollars).

Since 1964, investment expenditures have dropped steadily and in 1969 are some 0.2 billion rubles (0.4 billion dollars). Annual operating expenditures have increased during the same period and are estimated to be about 0.4 billion rubles (1.1

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billion dollars) this year, about 25 percent more than the 1964 expenditures. The higher operating expenditures result both from increases in the number of aircraft deployed and from the greater complexity of the newer aircraft. The increase in the estimated number of aircraft results in part from new evidence and in part from the buildup of TAF units along the Sino-Soviet border.

In 1970, TAF expenditures are expected to drop below those of 1969, to less than 0.5 billion rubles (1.3 billion dollars). Procurement of tactical fighters is expected to decline and, although Brewer D reconnaissance aircraft production will continue through 1970, overall procurement costs are expected to drop.

Procurement expenditures are expected to show significant increases during 1971-73 as the Flogger aircraft--and possibly a version of the Foxbat as well--are projected to reach series production rates. Investment expenditures are expected to reach 0.4 billion rubles (0.9 billion dollars) in 1973, the highest since 1965.

The operating costs associated with the newer, more advanced aircraft will be significantly greater than those required for the older models and these costs are expected to maintain their current level in the Seventies in spite of the declining number of aircraft deployed.

C. Naval Forces

Soviet expenditures for general purpose naval forces in 1969 are estimated to be 1.9 billion rubles (6.0 billion dollars), about 30 percent of spending for general purpose forces.* This is the highest

** Spending for ballistic missile submarines is not considered here as it is included in expenditures for strategic attack forces (see SR July 1969).*

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estimated outlay since the middle Fifties and reflects the emphasis on the highest priority task of the Soviet Navy--countering the US ballistic missile submarine force. Projected construction and conversion programs for several classes of guided missile ships, an antisubmarine warfare (ASW) escort, and five classes of attack submarines contribute to this high level.

The distribution of estimated spending among the elements of the naval forces in 1969 provides a picture of relative emphasis within the navy:

--submarines	20 percent
--major surface ships	20 percent
--minor surface ships	15 percent
--naval aviation	20 percent
--joint support element, including auxiliary ships and coastal defense	25 percent

Estimated spending has increased gradually from 1.7 billion rubles (5.2 billion dollars) in 1964 to the present level of 1.9 billion (6.0 billion dollars). During this period, the estimated naval expenditures maintained a relatively constant share of the rising total defense and space spending--slightly less than 10 percent--while all naval force elements except the submarine element had slightly increased spending. The submarine element, while dropping slightly, has still maintained an annual level of 0.4 billion rubles (1.4 billion dollars).

From a peak in 1969 Soviet naval expenditures are expected to decline slightly to 1.8 billion rubles (5.9 billion dollars) in 1973. This results almost entirely from an expected reduction in spending for naval aviation of about 0.2 billion rubles (0.4 billion dollars). The other force elements are expected either to increase slightly or to maintain their present levels of spending through 1973.

The share of naval spending allocated to major surface ships has risen from 15 percent in 1964 to


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about 20 percent in 1969. This share is expected to continue to increase in the early Seventies to about 25 percent of total naval spending in 1972-73--a result of continuing modernization of the surface fleet.

Soviet fleet modernization is being achieved through both conversion and construction (see Figure 3, below).

In 1966, the Soviets undertook conversion of the Kotlin class destroyer to SAM units. In 1968 they did the same with the Krupnyy class, and in 1969 the Soviets began conversion of the Sverdlov class cruiser to carry guided missiles. These relatively low-cost



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conversion programs, which are expected to continue through 1972-73, should add increased flexibility to surface fleet operations.

Construction programs are more costly than conversion programs. In the period 1964-68 the Soviets were constructing six classes of major surface combatants--CLGM Kynda, CLGM Kresta, DLG Kashin, PCE Mirka, PCE Petya, and the CLG Moskva. The CLGM Kynda and PCE Mirka programs were completed in 1965 and 1966, respectively. The remaining programs are still under way.

In addition to the continuation of these four programs, it is estimated that the Soviets began construction of two new classes of ships this year--a probable guided missile destroyer and a cruiser class. The armament of the cruiser is as yet unidentified, but all new Soviet surface combatants are designed to have an ASW capability and every major surface unit produced since 1962 is also equipped with SAM armaments which would facilitate ASW operations at sea without air cover.

Expenditures for construction and conversion programs are expected to average approximately 0.2 billion rubles (0.7 billion dollars) annually for the period 1970-73, compared with an average of about 0.1 billion rubles (0.5 billion dollars) during the years 1964-68.

The projected construction of the two new classes of major surface ships has resulted in total expenditures of about 0.5 billion rubles more (1.6 billion dollars) for the period 1970-73 than was forecast in last year's contribution.

Annual spending for the submarine force is estimated to have declined slightly from a peak of nearly 0.5 billion rubles (1.5 billion dollars) in 1964. Since this occurred during a period when estimated spending for all naval forces was increasing, the submarine share of the total declined measurably,

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from nearly 30 percent in 1964 to about 20 percent in 1969. This decline resulted from the completion of the E, F, and J class submarine construction programs.

Nuclear powered attack submarines offer the greatest promise for ASW, and the Soviets' construction programs indicate that they share this view. In 1968 the decline in expenditures leveled off as spending grew for three new construction programs, the nuclear powered C and V classes and the probably diesel powered B class attack submarine. In addition, two more submarine classes are projected and are estimated to reach full production in the early Seventies. Expenditures for general purpose submarine programs are expected to increase slightly from the 1969 level and by 1973 absorb approximately 25 percent of naval spending.

Most of the submarine expenditures during the period 1970-73 are expected to be for these new classes of submarines. It is projected that in 1973 the Soviets will have nearly 50 more new attack submarines deployed than in 1969. Almost three-fourths of these new submarines will probably be nuclear. Total expenditures for procurement of these systems are projected to be approximately 0.9 billion rubles (3.3 billion dollars) for this period. This level of spending is about four-fifths that estimated for procurement of the Y class ballistic missile submarine during the same period.

Naval aviation is estimated to have received an increasing share of total naval outlays from 1964 to 1969, reaching a share of 20 percent and a level of nearly 0.4 billion rubles (1.0 billion dollars) this year. Rising expenditures for aircraft procurement are primarily responsible.

It is estimated that procurement of the Bear D reconnaissance aircraft will end this year and that of the Mail in 1970. Expenditures for naval aviation are expected to decline sharply during the Seventies

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when relatively less spending is forecast for procurement of the Hormone A helicopter and the May reconnaissance aircraft. Expenditures are expected to drop to 0.2 billion rubles (0.5 billion dollars) in 1973, their lowest point during the entire period. The introduction of a new aircraft in the early Seventies, however, could alter this projection.

Spending for naval joint support is estimated to have increased from less than 0.4 billion rubles (1.1 billion dollars) in 1964 to almost 0.5 billion rubles (1.2 billion dollars) in 1969. This rise is due to increased procurement of coastal defense systems, auxiliary craft, electronic equipment, and nuclear weapons. These expenditures are expected to remain at the 1969 level through the Seventies.

D. Military Transport Aviation

Spending for military transport aviation during 1969 is estimated to be 0.6 billion rubles (1.7 billion dollars), about 10 percent of the total expenditures for the general purpose forces. This percentage has been the same since 1966 and is expected to remain at this level through 1972. (These expenditures cover all military transports and helicopters except those used in an ASW role.)

During the period 1964-69 the Soviets continued to increase the number of medium transports and the number of helicopters while operational light transports declined. The procurement of these aircraft has proceeded at a relatively low level and investment expenditures are estimated to have declined slightly. By phasing out large numbers of the smaller aircraft, the Soviets have maintained a fairly stable level of operating costs. Spending for transport aviation is expected to remain nearly constant through 1972 and to show a slight rise in 1973.

The Soviets recognize the importance of a well-equipped airlift force. Projected procurement programs concentrate more on heavy transports such as the AN-22 than on medium transports. The Soviets

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also are expected to continue their interest in helicopters. It is anticipated that increased procurement will account for most of the rise in spending in 1973.

The result of the spending throughout the period has been a significant improvement in Soviet airlift capability. Since 1964 airlift capacity of high performance (jet and turboprop) aircraft, measured in millions of pounds, has increased more than 30 percent and by 1973 is expected to have increased by another 20 percent over this year's capacity. (The measure used is basic load to maximum ranges. The increase would be even greater if measured in terms of heavier loads to shorter ranges.)

III. Manpower Implications

Manpower utilized by Soviet general purpose forces increased from less than 1.8 million men in 1964 to 2.0 million in 1969 and will probably stabilize at about that level through 1973. Throughout the 1964-73 period, these forces are expected to consistently absorb about 55 percent of overall Soviet military personnel strength even though general purpose outlays decline somewhat as a proportion of the rising defense and space total.

Requirements of the ground forces have been the major factor underlying the high demand for general purpose forces personnel. The size of the ground forces increased from 1.2 million men in 1964 to almost 1.4 million in 1969. Over the same period, growth in the manpower required for tactical aviation and the navy accounted for an additional 50,000 men.

After 1970 the slight increase in personnel projected for the ground forces will be largely offset by the decline in tactical aviation manpower. Although qualitative improvements in new generation aircraft require a higher level of manning per aircraft, fewer aircraft are being deployed and the rapid phaseout of older models results in a decline

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in total TAF requirements. Moreover, the Soviet program to augment and increase the availability of some low-strength ground force divisions in conjunction with the buildup of forces near the Chinese border is projected to be leveling off at that time.

The Soviets increased the allocation of manpower to their general purpose naval forces from almost 350,000 men in 1964 to about 380,000 in 1969 as the numbers of deployed submarines, surface ships, and naval aircraft grew steadily. This upward trend is expected to level off before 1973 at about 390,000 men.

The manpower required for submarines will be essentially constant, nearly 45,000 men through 1973. Attack submarine manpower requirements remain stable as the new classes of nuclear submarines offset the phasing out of diesel powered submarines.

The surface combatant force (both major and minor surface ship elements) will remain at about its present size, but a rising number of complex missile carrying ships will increase the manning level for these elements by about 7,000 men between 1970 and 1973.

Manpower for the Soviet naval air force increased some 10,000 men from 1964 to 1969, reflecting the introduction of more combat and reconnaissance aircraft into the four fleet areas. No significant changes in the level of manpower assigned to the naval air arm will occur by 1973, however, as about the same number of personnel released by the attrition of bombers will be required to man the new antisubmarine aircraft.

Manpower requirements for military transport aviation have fluctuated within narrow limits since 1964 and are estimated to be about 125,000 in 1969. It is expected that these requirements will increase by almost 5,000 by 1973 as the Soviets upgrade their inventory of high performance transport aircraft.

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IV. Comparison of US and USSR Expenditures, 1964-69

Although there are conceptual difficulties involved in estimating the dollar costs of Soviet programs as if they were built and paid for in the US, dollar comparisons do provide a basis for examining relative levels of effort.

In 1969, estimated dollar-equivalent outlays by the USSR will amount to only 19 billion dollars for general purpose forces, while the US is spending over 33 billion dollars. The economic costs of Vietnam constitute a significant portion of the absolute difference in comparable expenditure levels.

On a ruble basis, Soviet expenditures for general purpose forces are about 25 percent of total defense and space expenditures in 1969. US expenditures this year are expected to account for almost 40 percent of conceptually similar spending.

The USSR spent, on the average, the equivalent of about 18 billion dollars a year over the 1964-69 period (in constant 1968 prices), while US expenditures averaged about 27 billion dollars annually (in current prices). Comparable annual Soviet expenditures for these forces increased by almost 15 percent from 1964 to 1969. The corresponding US increase was over 80 percent.

Prior to the Vietnam conflict, US outlays for general purpose forces accounted for about a third of total defense and space spending, an average of about 18 billion dollars a year. If Vietnam spending were excluded from the comparison, US spending would probably still be larger than Soviet spending but not significantly so.

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ANNEX

Details Underlying Measurement of Soviet
General Purpose Force Expenditures

Because there are major differences between price structures in the US and the USSR, expenditures for the general purpose forces are presented in both rubles and dollars. Ruble values are the appropriate measure of the total military program mix and of the expenditure implications as they appear to the Soviets. Dollar-equivalent values reflect the general size of the Soviet forces as if they had been purchased in the US. They provide a basis for comparison with US programs.

The estimated and projected force levels in this supplement are OSR's judgments of the single most representative projection of forces within ranges estimated in the basic OSR contributions. These single points have been identified solely for costing purposes, and the same level of confidence should not be attached to the forces thus projected as to the ranges contained in the basic OSR contributions.

The validity of the expenditure estimates depends on the validity of the statement of the forces, the accuracy of the price data, and the time frame of the estimate. The expenditures implied by past and current programs are based on a fairly firm physical data base and are not subject to the same broad range of uncertainty that applies to the projected data. The continuing review of the size and technical characteristics of the forces will result in revisions as new information is received and actual Soviet force goals become more evident.

Values are in constant price terms. All expenditure changes reflect program changes and not changes in prices over time. The ruble values have been computed at constant 1955 prices. Dollar values express equivalent costs in the US in constant 1968 prices.

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The expenditure data in the tables are expressed in billions to two decimal places. This level of detail makes it possible to follow small movements in the underlying physical data. The uncertainties are such that no other significance should be attached to the second decimal place.

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Table 1

Estimated Numbers of Selected Equipment Items
and Manpower in the Soviet General Purpose Forces
Midyear 1964, 1969, and 1973

	<u>1964</u>	<u>1969</u> <u>Units</u>	<u>1973</u>
Tactical aircraft			
Fighters	2,610	3,040	3,000
Light bombers and reconnaissance aircraft	740	800	480
Total	<u>3,350</u>	<u>3,840</u>	<u>3,480</u>
Naval forces			
Helicopter cruisers	0	2	3
Missile cruisers	4	10	23
Missile destroyers	15	32	53
Missile patrol craft	135	160	145
Missile submarines			
Nuclear	14	33	33
Diesel	17	28	22
Torpedo attack submarines			
Nuclear	11	22	60
Diesel	300	225	155
Unknown propulsion	0	4	15
Naval aircraft	740	930	950
Military transport aviation			
Transport aircraft			
Light and very light utility	2,600	1,700	1,450
Medium	650	925	975
Heavy		5	40
Total	<u>3,250</u>	<u>2,630</u>	<u>2,465</u>
Helicopters	1,700	2,200	2,525
		<u>Thousands</u>	
Manpower			
Ground forces	1,180	1,380	1,400
Tactical air forces	100	120	110
Naval forces	350	380	390
Military transport aviation	130	120	130
Total	<u>1,760</u>	<u>2,000</u>	<u>2,030</u>

Note: The deployment figures in this table were specified for the purpose of deriving the single-valued expenditure series presented. These data fall within ranges of the estimates appearing in the basic contributions. They should not be interpreted as being an equally reliable but more precise statement of the forces.

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Table 2
Estimated Soviet Expenditures for General Purpose Forces, by Element
1964-73

	Billion New Rubles										
	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	
Ground forces	2.48	2.60	2.69	2.80	2.85	2.98	3.07	3.00	2.89	2.85	
Tactical air forces	0.74	0.69	0.64	0.59	0.52	0.53	0.47	0.53	0.63	0.71	
Military transport aviation	0.62	0.61	0.58	0.56	0.60	0.59	0.58	0.60	0.61	0.68	
Naval forces	1.66	1.72	1.76	1.81	1.86	1.92	1.90	1.86	1.84	1.83	
Submarines	0.46	0.42	0.40	0.39	0.40	0.42	0.44	0.45	0.45	0.45	
Surface ships	0.53	0.57	0.61	0.63	0.63	0.65	0.68	0.70	0.71	0.70	
Naval aviation	0.28	0.30	0.32	0.33	0.38	0.38	0.33	0.26	0.23	0.21	
Naval joint support	0.38	0.43	0.43	0.45	0.45	0.47	0.46	0.45	0.46	0.47	
Total	5.50	5.62	5.67	5.76	5.84	6.02	6.02	5.99	5.98	6.08	

Note: Expenditures for the general purpose forces include all outlays for personnel, procurement, operation and maintenance, construction, and nuclear weapons, but exclude expenditures for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) and for ballistic missile submarines, which have a strategic mission.

Rubles are expressed in 1955 prices. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.

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Table 3
Dollar Valuation of Estimated Soviet Expenditures
for General Purpose Forces, by Element
1964-73

	Billion 1968 Dollars									
	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
Ground forces	8.55	8.80	9.22	9.57	9.77	10.16	10.24	10.08	9.91	9.89
Tactical air forces	1.85	1.84	1.69	1.61	1.47	1.50	1.34	1.47	1.70	1.91
Military transport aviation	1.76	1.71	1.64	1.56	1.67	1.67	1.64	1.67	1.72	1.91
Naval forces	5.15	5.40	5.53	5.72	5.85	6.03	6.07	6.00	5.95	5.94
Submarines	1.46	1.38	1.30	1.29	1.33	1.40	1.48	1.50	1.49	1.51
Surface ships	2.00	2.16	2.31	2.39	2.39	2.48	2.57	2.66	2.68	2.69
Naval aviation	0.63	0.68	0.77	0.85	0.95	0.95	0.83	0.68	0.61	0.54
Naval joint support	1.06	1.18	1.15	1.20	1.18	1.20	1.19	1.15	1.18	1.21
Total	17.31	17.75	18.07	18.46	18.76	19.36	19.29	19.22	19.28	19.65

Note: Expenditures for the general purpose forces include all outlays for personnel, procurement, operation and maintenance, construction, and nuclear weapons, but exclude expenditures for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) and for ballistic missile submarines, which have a strategic mission.

Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.

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Table 4
Estimated Soviet Expenditures for General Purpose Forces, by Category
1964-73

	Billion New Rubles									
	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>
Investment expenditures	2.60	2.63	2.57	2.55	2.51	2.59	2.55	2.48	2.46	2.54
Procurement	2.50	2.52	2.46	2.44	2.40	2.48	2.44	2.37	2.35	2.43
Ammunition	0.18	0.19	0.20	0.21	0.20	0.20	0.19	0.18	0.16	0.16
Land armaments	0.13	0.13	0.15	0.17	0.17	0.18	0.17	0.13	0.13	0.14
Naval ships and boats	0.42	0.44	0.46	0.46	0.47	0.50	0.55	0.57	0.56	0.56
Aircraft	0.53	0.54	0.47	0.45	0.44	0.40	0.27	0.28	0.34	0.48
Missile systems	0.14	0.17	0.22	0.23	0.19	0.22	0.22	0.20	0.14	0.11
Electronic equipment	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.17	0.17	0.18	0.21	0.22	0.23	0.24
Nuclear weapons	0.53	0.48	0.38	0.34	0.33	0.35	0.41	0.35	0.34	0.30
Other	0.38	0.38	0.39	0.41	0.42	0.43	0.43	0.44	0.45	0.45
Facilities	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11
Operating expenditures	2.89	2.99	3.10	3.21	3.32	3.43	3.48	3.50	3.52	3.54
Personnel	1.87	1.89	1.94	1.98	2.02	2.10	2.12	2.12	2.12	2.12
Operation and maintenance	1.04	1.09	1.16	1.23	1.29	1.34	1.35	1.39	1.40	1.42
Total	<u>5.50</u>	<u>5.62</u>	<u>5.67</u>	<u>5.76</u>	<u>5.84</u>	<u>6.02</u>	<u>6.02</u>	<u>5.99</u>	<u>5.98</u>	<u>6.08</u>

Note: Rubles expressed in 1955 prices. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.

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Table 5

Dollar Valuation of Estimated Soviet Expenditures
for General Purpose Forces, by Category
1964-73

	Billion 1968 Dollars									
	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
Investment expenditures	6.28	6.42	6.40	6.45	6.38	6.54	6.35	6.23	6.25	6.55
Procurement	6.05	6.20	6.19	6.21	6.16	6.33	6.13	6.01	6.02	6.33
Ammunition	0.56	0.59	0.61	0.63	0.60	0.61	0.57	0.54	0.50	0.49
Land armaments	0.47	0.46	0.52	0.60	0.61	0.63	0.61	0.48	0.47	0.52
Naval ships and boats	1.46	1.53	1.57	1.60	1.61	1.73	1.89	1.96	1.94	1.94
Aircraft	1.49	1.50	1.33	1.24	1.23	1.11	0.76	0.74	0.94	1.31
Missile systems	0.33	0.40	0.47	0.49	0.42	0.47	0.46	0.45	0.33	0.26
Electronic equipment	0.28	0.29	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.33	0.36	0.38	0.39	0.39
Nuclear weapons	0.53	0.48	0.38	0.34	0.33	0.35	0.41	0.35	0.34	0.30
Other	0.94	0.97	0.99	1.02	1.05	1.08	1.08	1.10	1.10	1.11
Facilities	0.23	0.20	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22
Operating expenditures	11.03	11.32	11.67	12.02	12.39	12.82	12.94	12.99	13.03	13.10
Personnel	8.86	9.03	9.26	9.48	9.74	10.08	10.13	10.16	10.18	10.21
Operation and maintenance	2.16	2.29	2.41	2.53	2.65	2.75	2.80	2.83	2.85	2.91
Total	17.31	17.75	18.07	18.46	18.76	19.36	19.29	19.22	19.28	19.65

Note: Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.

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